| Role |
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| Primary category | Electronic Countermeasures | Electronic Countermeasures | Electronic Countermeasures | Electronic Countermeasures |
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| Subcategory | Protocol-based intervention | Protocol-based intervention | Command-link disruption | Command-link disruption |
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| Interception mechanism | Protocol-based intervention | Protocol-based intervention, Sensing only (no effect) | Command-link disruption, Navigation disruption | Command-link disruption, Navigation disruption, Navigation deception |
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| Target types | Small UAS | Small UAS | Small UAS | Small UAS |
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| Platform | Man-portable, Vehicle-mounted, Fixed site, Shipborne | Man-portable, Fixed site | Man-portable | Vehicle-mounted, Trailer, Fixed site |
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| Status | In service | In service | In production | In service |
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| Developer · Country | D-Fend Solutions · Israel | Sentrycs (an Ondas company) · Israel | DroneShield · Australia | ASELSAN · Türkiye |
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| Propulsion | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
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| Reusability | Reusable | Reusable | Reusable | Reusable |
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| Technical profile |
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| Frequency bands | Not recorded | Not recorded | ISM control bands (433 MHz, 915 MHz, 2.4 GHz, 5.8 GHz) and GNSS; a rotary dial selects active bands[1][2] | Drone command, FPV video and satellite-navigation links; preloaded, software-adjustable jamming frequency groups[1][4] |
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| Techniques | RF-cyber takeover: takes control over the drone's own protocol to land it or send it back; no jamming[1][2] | Protocol manipulation (Cyber over RF): disconnects the drone from its pilot, pairs it with Sentrycs, then lands it or sends it home[3][5] | Directional RF disruption of control, video and navigation links; the drone usually lands on the spot or returns to its start point[1] | Directional jamming of one target, omnidirectional jamming against swarms; spoofing listed[1][4] |
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| Detection | Passive RF detection, tracking and identification up to 4.5 km, 360°[1][5] | Passive RF; identifies serial number, operator and home location; 10 km or more claimed[1][3] | Not recorded | AESA radar (X-band 15 km or S-band 25 km instrumented; earlier Ku-band ACAR), day/thermal cameras, RF detection[1][4] |
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| Form factor | Tactical tripod, vehicle, stationary, maritime and covert backpack kits; carried in Pelican cases[1] | Fixed, mobile and tactical; portable kit in one Pelican case set up by one person in five minutes; Scout battery-powered portable[3][5][6] | Rifle-style handheld with directional antennas and MIL-STD-1913 rails for optics; IP54; −20 °C to +55 °C[1] | Mobile (vehicle, trailer) and fixed (mast, tower) versions[1][3] |
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| Weight | Not recorded | Not recorded | 7.3 kg with two batteries; more than 2 hours of operation per charge[1] | Not recorded |
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| Interfaces | Runs standalone, in a multilayer system or integrated with other C-UAS systems[4] | Works alongside radar and EO sensors; integrated into third-party C-UAS systems (Rafael, DroneShield)[4] | Not recorded | Hands targets to KORKUT 25, ŞAHİN 40 mm, EJDERHA and GÖKBERK; optional acoustic and DF sensors; TAFICS compatible[1][4] |
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| Characteristics |
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| Maximum range (km) | 1.2–4 kmManufacturer claim[1] | Not publicly disclosed | Up to 1 kmManufacturer claim[2] | Not recorded |
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| Detection range (km) | Up to 4.5 kmManufacturer claim[1] | At least 10 kmManufacturer claim[3] | Not recorded | Up to 25 kmManufacturer claim[1] |
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| Endurance (min) | Not recorded | Not recorded | More than 2 hoursManufacturer claim[1] | Not recorded |
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| Mass (kg) | Not recorded | Not recorded | 7.3 kgManufacturer claim[1] | Not recorded |
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| Guidance / cueing | Not recorded | Passive RF protocol analysis; drone and operator locationManufacturer claim[1] | Not recorded | AESA radar, day/thermal cameras, RF detection, AI-assisted C2Manufacturer claim[1] |
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| Effect | Takes control of the drone over its own link and lands it or returns itManufacturer claim[1][2] | Takes over the drone's link and lands it in a predefined zoneManufacturer claim[1][2] | Jams 433/915 MHz, 2.4/5.8 GHz and GNSSManufacturer claim[2][1] | Jams drone command, FPV video and satellite-navigation linksManufacturer claim[1] |
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| Launch / operating platform | Tripod, vehicle, stationary, maritime or backpackManufacturer claim[1] | Tripod-mounted portable kits and fixed installationsSecondary reference[2][3] | Not recorded | Vehicle, trailer, fixed mast or towerManufacturer claim[1] |
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| Programme |
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| Operators (in service / ordered) | | 3: Germany, United States, Canada, Mexico, Undisclosed European country[2][3][4][6] | | 5: Türkiye, Northern Cyprus, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Angola[2][3] |
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| Platforms and integration | Not recorded | Rafael Drone Dome (in service), DroneShield DroneSentry (in service), Lockheed Martin Sanctum (in development), Ondas Iron Drone Raider (in development)[4][5] | Not recorded | KORKUT 25 and ŞAHİN 40 mm guns (proposed), EJDERHA high-power electromagnetic system (proposed), GÖKBERK laser (proposed), Vehicles at the Presidential Complex (in service), MİR unmanned surface vessel (proposed)[1][2][4] |
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| Public contracts | Not recorded | 3 recorded. Latest: 2026-04-07 · Federal, state and local public-safety agencies (2026 FIFA World Cup) · in the millions of dollars[2][3][6][7][8] | 1 recorded. Latest: 2026-09-29 · U.S. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal (JIATF-401 Domestic Shield) · US$500,000,000 (ceiling)[4][5] | Not recorded |
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| Latest development | 2026-06-02: Motorola Solutions acquisition agreed[4] | 2026-06: Lockheed Martin integration[4] | 2023-07: US$33 million U.S. order[3] | 2024-03: Border demonstration[4] |
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